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Comments in Reply
Richard K. NeumannJr.
In his response to my article, Dan Subotnik makes five claims:
1. Discrimination can never be inferred from statistics.
2. "The story of women in legal education may well be the greatest
story of group professional success ever told."
3. Women sabotage themselves in academic employment because
they have children and quit teaching to follow husbands when
their husbands switch jobs.
4. Women naturally predominate in off-tenure-track legal writing
jobs because legal writing teachers "work[] substantially fewer
hours... than tenure-track teachers."
5. Men naturally predominate as law school deans and on law school
faculties because they have testosterone and don't worry about
relationship issues as much as women do.
Let's consider each of these in turn.
1. Discriminationcan never be inferredfrom statistics.
Subotnik's only evidence for this is a quotation from Thomas Sowell.
Sowell's only evidence is a list of statistical disparities-virtually all of them
irrelevant, such as the Cambodian donut shops-that plainly are not caused
by discrimination.' If one is looking for non sequiturs, Sowell's own train of
reasoning is a giant one. The fact that some or even many statistical disparities
are not caused by discrimination does not prove that discrimination can never
be inferred from statistics, or even that it usually can't. All it proves is that
discrimination cannot be inferred from statistics 100 percent of the time,
which is obviously true anyway.
To open any book by Sowell is to find him using statistics in support of
almost any proposition he likes, usually without providing details that would
allow us to evaluate statistical reliability or validity. Among other things, he
uses statistics to argue that discrimination does not exist or exists much less
frequently than is commonly believed.2 Sowell thinks that inequalities are
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caused by "performance differences" or "differences in luck [or] other factors."3 The claim that discrimination can never be inferred from statistics is a
slogan, not a conclusion derived from dispassionate and comprehensive empirical research and reflection.
The truth is that discrimination or bias is usually not inferable from a single
statistic standing alone. A single statistic is a snapshot, showing one view of a
situation from one angle. To show causation for an inequality, something
more is needed. That can come from a comprehensive battery of statistics,
showing the situation from many different views and many different angles.
(My article provided that.) Or it can come from nonstatistical evidence such as
narratives of discrimination. (My article cited several of those.) A multilayered
examination like this is considered probative not only among social scientists
and statisticians, but also in law.4
Statistics dominate social science research for very good reasons. In complex situations statistical evidence is often the most reliable method of figuring out what is really going on beneath the surface of everyday appearances.
And statistical evidence is often the best evidence of motives that remain
hidden because they are unexpressed or not understood even by the actors
themselves. Accordingly, courts rely extensively on statistics to resolve, among
other things, environmental impact questions,jury composition disputes, and
disparate impact discrimination cases. In my article, the sheer weight of the
statistics-no matter what measure is used, no matter how you look at the
question-shows similar patterns of disadvantage to women throughout legal
education.
2. "The stoiy of women in legal education may well be the greatest story of group
professional success ever told" (141).
To support this claim, Subotnik notes that although women once were
almost entirely absent from law school faculties, they are now 22 percent of
full professors, 46 percent of associate professors, and 48 percent of assistant
professors. (Like Sowell, Subotnik believes that statistics can prove an absence
of discrimination.)
Subotnik ignores, among other things, the following. The associate and
assistant professor numbers are misleading because nearly three-quarters of
the teaching professoriat are full professors (page 325 in my article). Men
disproportionately receive associate professor appointments while women
disproportionately become assistant professors (341). Salary data, where available, show women earning less than men, even when controlled forjob status
and experience (337-39). In the clinical and legal writing fields, where some
jobs are tenure-tracked and others are not, men are disproportionately on
tenure track and women are disproportionately off (329). Off-tenure-track
jobs in general and assistant deanships are overwhelmingly female (324-29).

3.

Sowell, Quest, supa note 1, at 62.
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See Baemore v. Frida, 478 U.S. 385,398-401 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Lnited States,
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Comments in Reply
Schools with no off-tenure-trackjobs have, on average, higher female percentages of tenure-track faculty (335). Female students earn higher grades than
men in college but lower grades in law school (320-22). And a significant
number of women believe discrimination occurs (348-51).
Subotnik does not ignore the statistics showing that women apply for
tenure-track teaching jobs less frequently than one would expect, and that
they receive tenure at lower rates than men. He misinterprets them, as I
explain below.
3. Women sabotage themselves in academic employment because they have children
and quit teachingtofollow husbands when their husbands switchjobs.
Subotnik's primary support for this is quotations from two books, Joan
Williams's Unbending Gende6 and Susan Estrich's Sex and Power.6 In each case
Subotnik takes quotations out of context and misrepesents the source.
Subotnik quotes the following sentence from Williams's book: "It is time to
admit that women as a group do not perform the same as men as a group
whenjobs are designed around an ideal worker with men [having] access to a
flow of family work most women do not enjoy" (144). Subotnik then attributes
to Williams the belief that (in his words) "women cannot be competitive [and]
cannot normally become the 'ideal workers' who earn their promotions."
Williams says no such thing, and her position is exactly the opposite.
Williams unambiguously uses the word "ideal" in an ironicsense. She does
not use the word to describe the best possible worker. She instead analyzes an
assumption that employees should not take time off for childbearing or
childcare and should be able to work much more than full time and relocate
whenever needed for career reasons. She cites evidence showing that this
"ideal" kind of worker is not more productive than other types, and that
employers who are not fixated on the "ideal" have advantages in retention,
recruitment, and employee relations in general.7 Although many women do
satisfy the "ideal," it is based on "masculine norms" rather than on true
measures of effectiveness. Williams argues that designing ajob around masculine privileges in family life constitutes sex discrimination in the same way as
"[d] esigningjobs around men's bodies" and thus is a significant factor in "the
economic marginalization of women."8 She also argues that expecting this
"ideal" from women violates existing antidiscrimination statutes.9 And she
pointedly quotesJudith Vladek: "Having a baby is used as an excuse not to give
women opportunities."'"
Subotnik similarly misrepresents the Estrich book (146). Nowhere does
Estrich "rebuke" young women for refusing to make sacrifices. She talks
5.

Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It 69 (New York,

2000).
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NewYork, 2000.
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Williams, supra note 5, at 84-100.

8. M at 65.
9. M at 101-10.
10. Idat 69.
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instead of women who are discouraged by forms of discrimination that are
subtle, often unconscious, and therefore harder to recognize and challenge
than the more overt forms of the past." The "drop out in much higher
numbers" quotation actually appears in a discussion of sex discrimination and
is preceded by "Women are promoted to partner or president less often than
men in corporate America."'12 The "simply don't want to get to the top"
quotation does not reflect a lack of willpower on the part of women. It appears
in a discussion of legitimate dissatisfaction with the Dilbertization of many
corporate jobs. These distortions misrepresent a book in which the following
appears early and prominently: "Every society, Margaret Mead observed,
divides tasks between men and women, and while the divisions vary with the
society, the rankings don't. -What the men do, whatever it is, is considered
more valuable, which makes men more powerful."'"
Subotnik also attributes to me positions that I never took. I did not say that
"women are not welcome in the dean's office" (146). I said that although the
female percentage of professorial associate deans seems to be about the same
as the female percentage of faculty from whom professorial deans are drawn,
women are underrepresented among law school deans and overrepresented
among nonprofessorial associate deans and assistant deans (323-25 of my
article).
I also did not say that "women's application rate in the Faculty Appointments Register is enough to tell the whole story" of law school faculty hiring
(143). Subotnik claims-inaccurately--that "the job success rate for female
tenure-track FAR applicants is marginally higher than that of men" (143,
emphasis added). As I pointed out in my article, the AALS statistics do not
include a tenure-track "success" rate (342). Because FAR "success" statistics do
not separate tenure-track FAR hiring from non-tenure-track hiring, and because women are the overwhelming majority of non-tenure-track hires (some
of which happen through the FAR), we do not know whether those off-tenuretrack hires account for the small extra "success" rate shown in Table 23 of my
article. Moreover, the FAR "success" rate is an unreliable picture of law school
hiring because only about half of faculty hiring occurs through the FAR (342).
And the "success" rate hides the fact that men are hired disproportionately at
associate professor ranks (341).
Moreover, the numbers on tenuring rates in the first full sentence on page
144 are not from my article. I know of no reliable source of statistics for men
and women who "move to another law school," and the percentages given by

11.

For example: 1Theworst of it,
these days, is that you can almost neser be sure. Would thev
treat a man this way, I ask myself all the time ....Unconscious discrimination is harder to
recogni/e and more difficult to proe, which makes it a more insidious problem for women.Estrich. supra note 6. at 9-10.

12. The quotation appears on page 10 of the Estrich book, not on page 12 as cited by Suboltnik.
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Subotnik are not computable from any source cited by me or by him. (The
AALS statistics in Tables 17 and 18 in my article show percentages of faculty
who failed to receive tenure, were no longer listed at an AALS school, or
resigned before decision.)
4. Women naturallypredominate in off-tenure-track legal writingjobs because legal
writing teachers "work[] substantially fewer hours. . . than tenure-track teachers"
(145).'
Here, and elsewhere in his piece, Subotnik introduces ideas with the word
if,
as though they ate possibilities, and then almost immediately treats them as
proven facts-even though he hasn't provided proof. He cites no evidence to
support the idea that legal writing teachers work less than tenure-track teachers do. He can't because both the empirical evidence 5 and the anecdotal
evidence" emphatically show the opposite. Moreover, Subotnik ignores the
other half of the off-tenure-track population: clinicians, who are nearly as
disproportionately female as the off-tenure-track legal writing teachers (32829 in my article). And the truth is that all teaching-on tenure track or off,
and regardless of subject matter-offers a huge advantage to a parent over law
practice: more flexible working hours. A teacher has far more control than a
lawyer does over when the work gets done.
Here, too, Subotnik misrepresents a source. He cites an article by Maureen
J. Arrigo for the proposition that legal writing teachers "may not have the
same elite school and law review pedigrees as tenure-track faculty" (145). Here
is what Arrigo actually said, beginning on the page Subotnik cites to:
In fact,... when viewed as a "total package," required credentials for LRW's
[legal writing teachers] are often the same as and sometimes higher than
those for a non-LRW teaching position. To the extent that the required
credentials are "lower," this typically translates to one being able to get a LRW
teaching position7 even if one did not attend one of the top twenty "professor

feeder schools."

5. Men naturally predominate as law school deans and on law school faculties
because they have testosterone and don't wony about relationship issues as much as
women do. According to Subotnik, women "lack the psychological makeup for
success" because they "seek to establish and deepen relationships with those
14. Subomik calls legal writing "legal methods."
15. Jo Anne Durako, A Snapshot of Legal Writing Programs at the Millennium, 6 Legal Writing
95, 108-09 (2000).
16. Along with many others, I might be able to testify on this subject. I am tenured and publish
regularly, both articles and books. The hardest work I've ever done, by far, was teaching legal
writing-even though during that time I wrote nothing for publication. Teaching legal
writing consumes enormous amounts of time and effort. Every person I know who has taught
legal writing as well as doctrinal courses says pretty much the same thing. And every faculty
committee that I have observed examining a legal writing program has come away with new
respect for what legal writing teachers do and for how hard the work is.
17. Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 70 Temple L.
Rev. 117, 155-56 (1977).
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around them" while men "attempt to dominate their environments" (147).
"[TI estosterone and estrogen are directly implicated in the inability of women
as a group to match the success of men in the corporate world"-and this has
something to do with lust (148). "The male is programmed to project himself
onto life's stage and take the consequences" while women, because they "must
be more cautious ...in [their] sexual dealings," look for safe jobs (149).
Merely to repeat this nonsense is to discredit it.
While researching Women in Legal Education: VWhat the Statistics Show, I
learned that women's progress in our field has slowed down and in some ways
stopped, something that I and perhaps most other people had not realized. I
think I had expected to find only pockets of discrimination. The only credible
explanation I was able to discover both for the statistics and for my surprise at
them is embodied in a quotation that appears on page 351 of my article and
which I repeat here because it completes a refutation of Subotnik's response.
We no longer live in an era in which most discrimination occurs openly and
loudly; instead it persists
underground ... in a plethora of work practices and cultural norms that only
appear unbiased. They are common and mundane-and woven into the
fabric of an organization's status quo-which is why most people don't notice
them, let alone question them. But they create a subtle pattern of vlslemic
disadvantage .... "S
Let's solve this problem. My article mentioned that the ABA Commission
on Women in the Profession has urged each school to conduct a gender selfstud), and has provided a methodology for doing so. That sounds like a good
way to start (352).

18. Debra E. Meyerson &Joyce K. Fletcher, A Modest Manifesto for Shanering the Glass Ceiling,
larv. Bus. Rev.,Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 127, 128.

